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INVENTION is here interpreted broadly as the production of know-
ledge. From the viewpoint of welfare economics, the determination
of optimal resource allocation for invention will depend on the tech-
nological characteristics of the invention process and the nature of
the market for knowledge.
The classic question of welfare economics will be asked here: to
what extent does perfect competition lead to an optimal allocation of
resources? We know from years of patient refinement that competition
insures the achievement of a Pareto optimum under certain hypotheses.
The model usually assumes among other things, that (1) the utility
functions of consumers and the transformation functions of pro-
ducers are well-defined functions of the commodities in the economic
system, and (2) the transformation functions do not display indivisibi-
lities (more strictly, the transformation sets are convex). The second
condition needs no comment. The first seems to be innocuous but
in fact conceals two basic assumptions of the usual models. It pro-
hibits uncertainty in the production relations and in the utility func-
tions, and it requires that all the commodities relevant either to pro-
duction or to the welfare of individuals be traded on the market. This
will not be the case when a commodity for one reason or another
cannot be made into private property.
We have then three of the classical reasons for the possible failure
of perfect competition to achieve optimality in resource allocation:
indivisibilities, inappropriability, and uncertainty. The first problem
has been much studied in the literature under the heading of marginal-
cost pricing and the second under that of divergence between social
and private benefit (or cost), but the theory of optimal allocation of
resources under uncertainty has had much less attention. I will sum-
marize what formal theory exists and then point to the critical notion
of information, which arises only in the context of uncertainty. The
NOTE: I have benefited greatly from the comments of my colleague, William Capron.
I am also indebted to Richard R. Nelson, Edward Phelps, and Sidney Winter of The
RAND Corporation for their helpful discussion.
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economic characteristics of information as a commodity and, in
particular, of invention as a process for the production of information
are next examined. It is shown that all three of the reasons given above
for a failure of the competitive system to achieve an optimal resource
allocation hold in the case of invention. On theoretical grounds a
number of considerations are adduced as to the likely biases in the
misallocation and the implications for economic organization.'
Resource Allocation under Uncertainty
The role of the competitive system in allocating uncertainty seems to
have received little systematic attention.2 I will first sketch an ideal
economy in which the allocation problem can be solved by competition
and then indicate some of the devices in the real world which approxi-
mate this solution.
Suppose for simplicity that uncertainty occurs only in production
relations. Producers have to make a decision on inputs at the present
moment, but the outputs are not completely predictable from the in-
puts. We may formally describe the outputs as determined by the in-
puts and a "state of nature" which is unknown to the producers. Let
us define a "commodity-option" as a commodity in the ordinary sense
labeled with a state of nature. This definition is analogous to the differ-
entiation of a given physical commodity according to date in capital
theory or according to place in location theory. The production of a
given commodity under uncertainty can then be described as the
production of a vector of commodity-options.
This description can be most easily exemplified by reference to
agricultural production. The state of nature may be identified with the
weather. Then, to any given set of inputs there corresponds a number
of bushels of wheat if the rainfall is good and a different number if
rainfall is bad. We can introduce intermediate conditi.ons of rainfall
1Forotheranalyses withsimilar points of view, see R. R. Nelson, "The Simple
Economics of Basic Scientific Research," Journal of Political Economy, 1959, pp. 297—306;
and C. J. Hitch, "The Character of Research and Development in a Competitive
Economy," The RAND Corporation, p. 1297, May 1958.
2Thefirst studies lam aware of are the papers of M. Allais and myself, both presented
in 1952 to the Colloque International sur le Risque in Paris; see M. Allais, "Généralisation
des theories de l'équilibre économique général et du rendement social au cas du risque,"
and K. J. Arrow, "Role des valeurs bousières pour Ia repartition Ia meilleure des risques,"
both in Economèirie,ColloquesInternationaux du Centre National de Ia Reclierche
Scientifique, Vol. XL, Paris, Centre National de Ia Recherche Scientifique, 1953.Allais'
paper has also appeared in Econometrica, 1953, pp. 269—290. The theory has received a
very elegant generalization by G. Debreu in Theory of Values, New York, Wiley, 1959,
Chap. VII.
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in any number as alternative states of nature; we can increase the
number of relevant variables which enter into the description of the
state of nature, for example by adding temperature. By extension of
this procedure, we can give a formal description of any kind of uncer-
tainty in production.
Suppose—and this is the critical idealization of the economy—we
have a market for all commodity-options. What is traded on each
market are contracts in which the buyers pay an agreed sum and the
sellers agree to deliver prescribed quantities of a given commodity
ifacertain state of nature prevails and nothing if that state of
nature does not occur. For any given set of inputs, the firm knows
its output under each state of nature and sells a corresponding quantity
of commodity-options; its revenue is then completely determined. It
may choose its inputs so as to maximize profits.
The income of consumers is derived from their sale of supplies,
including labor, to firms and their receipt of profits, which are assumed
completely distributed. They purchase commodity-options so as to
maximize their expected utility given the budget restraint imposed by
their incomes. An equilibrium is reached on all commodity-option
markets, and this equilibrium has precisely the same Pareto-optimality
properties as competitive equilibrium under certainty.
In particular, the markets for commodity-options in this ideal
model serve the function of achieving an optimal allocation of risk
bearing among the members of the economy. This allocation takes
account of differences in both resources and tastes for risk bearing.
Among other implications, risk bearing and production are separated
economic functions. The use of inputs, including human talents, in
their most productive mode is not inhibited by unwillingness or
inability to bear risks by either firms or productive agents.
But the real economic system does not possess markets for com-
modity-options. To see what substitutes exist, let us first consider a
model economy at the other extreme, in that no provisions for reallo-
cating risk bearing exist. Each firm makes its input decisions; then
outputs are produced as determined by the inputs and the state of
nature. Prices are then set to clear the market. The prices that finally
prevail will be a function of the state of nature.
The firm and its owners cannot relieve themselves of risk bearing in
this model. Hence any unwillingness or inability to bear risks will
give rise to a non optimal allocation of resources, in that there will be
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discrimination against risky enterprises as compared with the opti-
mum. A preference for risk might give rise to misallocation in the
opposite direction, but the limitations of financial resources are likely
to make underinvestment in risky enterprises more likely than the
opposite. The inability of individuals to buy protection against un-
certainty similarly gives rise to a loss of welfare.
In fact, a number of institutional arrangements have arisen to miti-
gate the problem of assumption of risk. Suppose that each firm and
individual in the economy could forecast perfectly what prices would
be under each state of nature. Suppose further there were a lottery
on the states of nature, so that before the state of nature is known any
individual or firm may place bets. Then it can be seen that the effect
from the viewpoint of any given individual or firm is the same as if
there were markets for commodity-options of all types, since any
commodity-option can be achieved by a combination of a bet on the
appropriate state of nature and an intention to purchase or sell the
commodity in question if the state of nature occurs.
References to lotteries and bets may smack of frivolity, but we need
only think of insurance to appreciate that the shifting of risks through
what are in effect bets on the state of nature is a highly significant
phenomenon. If insurance were available against any conceivable
event, it follows from the preceding discussion that optimal allocation
would be achieved. Of course, insurance as customarily defined covers
only a small range of events relevant to the economic world; much
more important in shifting risks are securities, particularly common
stocks and money. By shifting freely their proprietary interests among
different firms, individuals can to a large extent bet on the different
states of nature which favor firms differentially. This freedom to in-
sure against many contingencies is enhanced by the alternatives of
holding cash and going short.
Unfortunately, it is only too clear that the shifting of risks in the
real world is incomplete. The great predominance of internal over
external equity financing in industry is one illustration of the fact that
securities do not completely fulfill their allocative role with respect
to risks. There are a number of reasons why this should be so, but I
will confine myself to one, of special significance with regard to inven-
tion. In insurance practice, reference is made to the moral factor as a
limit to the possibilities of insurance. For example, a fire insurance
policy cannot exceed in amount the value of the goods insured. From
the purely actuarial standpoint, there is no reason for this limitation;
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the reason for the limit is that the insurance policy changes the incen-
tives of the insured, in this case, creating an incentive for arson or at
the very least for carelessness. The general principle is the difficulty
of distinguishing between a state of nature and a decision by the in-
sured. As a result, any insurance policy and in general any device for
shifting risks can have the effect of dulling incentives. A fire insurance
policy, even when limited in amount to the value of the goods covered,
weakens the motivation for fire prevention. Thus, steps which im-
prove the efficiency of the economy with respect to risk bearing may
decrease its technical efficiency.
One device for mitigating the adverse incentive effects of insurance
is coinsurance; the insurance extends only to part of the amount at
risk for the insured. This device is used, for example, in coverage of
medical risks. It clearly represents a compromise between incentive
effects and allocation of risk bearing, sacrificing something in both
directions.
Two exemplifications of the moral factor are of special relevance in
regard to highly risky business activities, including invention. Success
in such activities depends on an inextricable tangle of objective
uncertainties and decisions of the entrepreneurs and is certainly unin-
surable. On the other hand, such activities should be undertaken if the
expected return exceeds the market rate of return, no matter what the
variance j5•3Theexistence of common stocks would seem to solve the
allocation problem; any individual stockholder can reduce his risk by
buying only a small part of the stock and diversifying his portfolio to
achieve his own preferred risk level. But then again the actual mana-
gers no longer receive the full reward of their decisions; the shifting
of risks is again accompanied by a weakening of incentives to efficiency.
Substitute motivations whether pecuniary, such as executive compen-
sation and profit sharing, or nonpecuniary, such as prestige, may be
found, but the dilemma of the moral factor can never be completely
resolved.
A second example is the cost-plus contract in one of its various
forms. When production costs on military items are highly uncertain,
the military establishment will pay, not a fixed unit price, but thecost
of production plus an amount which today is usually a fixed fee. Such
a contract could be regarded as a combination of a fixed-price contract
with an insurance against costs. The insurance premium could be
The va'idity of this statement depends onsome unstatedassumptions,but the point
tobe made is unaffected by minor qualifications.
613WELFARE ECONOMICS AND INVENTIVE ACTIVITY
regarded as the difference between the fixed price the government
would be willing to pay and the fixed fee.
Cost-plus contracts are necessitated by the inability or unwilling-
ness of firms to bear the risks. The government has superior risk bear-
ing ability and so the burden is shifted to it. It is then enabled to buy
from firms on the basis of their productive efficiency rather than their
risk bearing ability, which may be only imperfectly correlated. But
cost-plus contracts notoriously have their adverse allocative effects.4
This somewhat lengthy digression on the theory of risk bearing
seemed necessitated by the paucity of literature on the subject. The
main conclusions to be drawn are the following: (1) the economic
system has devices for shifting risks, but they are limited and imperfect;
hence, one would expect an underinvestment in risky activities; (2) it
is undoubtedly worthwhile to enlarge the variety of such devices, but
the moral factor creates a limit to their potential.
Information as a Commodity
Uncertainty usually creates a still more subtle problem in resource
allocation; information becomes a commodity. Suppose that in one
part of the economic system an observation has been made whose out-
come, if known, would affect anyone's estimates of the probabilities
of the different states of nature. Such observations arise out of research
but they also arise in the daily course of economic life as a by-product
of other economic activities. An entrepreneur will automatically
acquire a knowledge of demand and production conditions in his field
which is available to others only with special effort. Information will
frequently have an economic value, in the sense that anyone possessing
the information can make greater profits than would otherwise be the
case.
It might be expected that information wilt be traded in, and of
course to a considerable extent this is the case, as is illustrated by the
numerous economic institutions for transmission of information, such
as newspapers. But in many instances, the problem of an optimal
allocation is sharply raised. The cost of transmitting a given body of
information is frequently very low. If it were zero, then optimal allo-
cation would obviously call for unlimited distribution of the informa-
These remarks are not intended as a complete evaluation of cost-plus contracts. In
particular, there are, to a certain extent, other incentives which mitigate the adverse
effects on efficiency.
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tion without cost. In fact, a given piece of information is by definition
an indivisible commodity, and the classical problems of allocation in
the presence of indivisibilities appear here. The owner of the informa-
tion should not extract the economic value which is there, if optimal
allocation is to be achieved; but he is a monopolist, to some small
extent and will seek to take advantage of this fact.
In the absence of special legal protection, the owner cannot, how-
ever, simply sell information on the open market. Any one purchaser
can destroy tWe monopoly, since he can reproduce the information at
little or no cost. Thus the only effective monopoly would be the use of
the information by the original possessor. This, however, will not only
be socially inefficient, but also may not be of much use to the owner
of the information either, since he may not be able to exploit it as
effectively as others.
With suitable legal measures, information may become an appro-
priable commodity. Then the monopoly power can indeed be exerted.
However, no amount of legal can make a thoroughly
appropriable commodity of something so intangible as information.
The very use of the information in any productive way is bound to re-
veal it, at least in part. Mobility of personnel among firms provides a
way of spreading information. Legally imposed property rights can
provide only a partial barrier, since there are obviously enormous
difficulties in defining in any sharp way an item of information and
differentiating it from other similar sounding items.
The demand for information also has uncomfortable properties. In
the first place, the use of information is certainly subject to indivisi-
bilities; the use of information about production possibilities, for
example, need not depend on the rate of production. In the second
place, there is a fundamental paradox in the determination of demand
for information; its value for the purchaser is not known until he has
the information, but then he has in effect acquired it without cost. Of
course, if the seller can retain property rights in the use of the informa-
tion, this would be no problem, but given incomplete appropriability,
the potential buyer will base his decision to purchase information on
less than optimal criteria. He may act, for example, on the average
value of information in that class as revealed by past experience. If
any particular item of information has differing values for different
economic agents, this procedure will lead both to a nonoptimal pur-
chase of information at any given price and also to a nonoptimal
allocation of the information purchased.
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It should be made clear that from the standpoint of efficiently dis-
tributing an existing stock of information, the difficulties of appro-
priation are an advantage, provided there are no costs of transmitting
information, since then optimal allocation calls for free distribution.
The chief point made here is the difficulty of creating a market for
information if one should be desired for any reason.
It follows from the preceding discussion that costs of transmitting
information create allocative difficulties which would be absent other-
wise. Information should be transmitted at marginal cost, but then
the demand difficulties raised above will exist. From the viewpoint of
optimal allocation, the purchasing industry will be faced with the
problems created by indivisibilities; and we still leave unsolved the
problem of the purchaser's inability to judge in advance the value
of the information he buys. There is a strong case for centralized
decision making under these circumstances.
Invention as the Production of Information
The central economic fact about the processes of invention and
research is that they are devoted to the production of information. By
the very definition of information, invention must be a risky process, in
that the output (information obtained) can never be predicted per-
fectly from the inputs. We can now apply the discussion of the pre-
ceding two sections.
Since it is a risky process, there is bound to be some discrimination
against investment in inventive and research activities. In this field,
especially, the moral factor will weigh heavily against any kind of
insurance or equivalent form of risk bearing. Insurance against
failure to develop a desired new product or process would surely very
greatly weaken the incentives to succeed. The only way, within the
private enterprise system, to minimize this problem is the conduct of
research by large corporations with many projects going on, each
small in scale compared with the net revenue of the corporation.
Then the corporation acts as its own insurance company. But clearly
this is only an imperfect solution.
The deeper problems of misallocation arise from the nature of the
product. As we have seen, information is a commodity with peculiar
attributes, particularly embarrassing for the achievement of optimal
allocation. In the first place, any information obtained, say a new
method of production, should, from the welfare point of view, be
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available free of charge (apart from the cost of transmitting informa-
tion). This insures optimal utilization of the information but of course
provides no incentive for investment in research. In an ideal socialist
economy, the reward for invention would be completely separated
from any charge to the users of the information.5 In a free enterprise
economy, inventive activity is supported by using the invention to
create property rights; precisely to the extent that it is successful, there
is an underutilization of the information. The property rights may be
in the information itself, through patents and similar legal devices, or
in the intangible assets of the firm if the information is retained by the
firm and used only to increase its profits.
The first problem, then, is that in a free enterprise economy the
profitability of invention requires a nonoptimal allocation of resources.
But it may still be asked whether or not the allocation of resources to
inventive activity is optimal. The discussion of the preceding section
makes it clear that we would not expect this to be so; that, in fact, a
downward bias in the amount of resources devoted to inventive
activity is very likely. Whatever the price, the demand for information
is less than optimal for two reasons: (1) since the price is positive and
not at its optimal value of zero, the demand is bound to be below the
optimal; (2) as seen before, at any given price, the very nature of
information will lead to a lower demand than would be optimal.
As already remarked, the inventor will in any case have considerable
difficulty in appropriating the information produced. Patent laws
would have to be unimaginably complex and subtle to permit such
appropriation on a large scale. Suppose, as the result of elaborate
tests, some metal is discovered to have a desirable property, say
resistance to high heat. Then of course every use of the metal for
which this property is relevant would also use this information, and
the user would be made to pay for it. But, even more, if another inven-
tor is stimulated to examine chemically related metals for heat resist-
ance, he is using the information already discovered and should pay
for it in some measure; and any beneficiary of his discoveries should
also pay. One would have to have elaborate distinctions of partial
property rights of all degrees to make the system at all tolerable. In
the interests of the possibility of enforcement, actual patent laws
sharply restrict the range of appropriable information and thereby
reduce the incentives to engage in inventive and research activities.
This separation exists in the Soviet Union, according to N. M. Kaplan and R. H.
Moorsteen of The RAND Corporation (verbal communication).
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These last considerations bring into focus the interdependence of
inventive activities, which reinforces the difficulties in achieving an
optimal allocation of the results. Information is not only the product
of inventive activity, it is also an input—in some sense, the major input
apart from the talent of the inventor. The school of thought that
emphasizes the determination of invention by the social climate as
demonstrated by the simultaneity of inventions in effect emphasizes
strongly the productive role of previous information in the creation of
new information. While these interrelations do not create any new
difficulties in principle, they intensify the previously established ones.
To appropriate information for use as a basis for further research is
much more difficult than to appropriate it for use in producing com-
modities; and the value of information for use in developing further
information is much more conjectural than the value of its use in
production and therefore much more likely to be underestimated.
Consequently, if a price is charged for the information, the demand is
even more likely to be suboptimal.
Thus basic research, the output of which is only used as an informa-
tional input into other inventive activities, is especially unlikely to be
rewarded. In fact, it is likely to be of commercial value to the firm
undertaking it only if other firms are prevented from using the informa-
tion obtained. But such restriction on the transmittal of information
will reduce the efficiency of inventive activity in general and will
therefore reduce its quantity also. We may put the matter in terms of
sequential decision making. The a priori probability distribution of
the true state of nature is relatively flat to begin with. On the other
hand, the successive a posteriori distributions after more and more stud-
ies have been conducted are more and more sharply peaked or con-
centrated in a more limited range, and we therefore have better and
better information for deciding what the next step in research shall
be. This implies that, at the beginning, the preferences among alterna-
tive possible lines of investigation are much less sharply defined than
they are apt to be later on and suggests, at least, the importance of
having a wide variety of studies to begin with, the less promising
being gradually eliminated as information is accumulated.6 At each
stage the decisions about the next step should be based on all avail-
able information. This would require an unrestricted flow of informa-
STheimportance of parallel research developments in the case of uncertainty has been
especially stressed by Burton H. Klein; see his, "A Radical Proposal for R. and D.,"
Fortune, May 1958, p. 112 if.; and Klein and W. H. Meckling, "Application of Operations
Research to Development Decisions," Operations Research, 1958, pp. 352—363.
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tion among different projects which is incompatible with the complete
decentralization of an ideal free enterprise system. When the pro-
duction of information is important, the classic economic case in
which the price system replaces the detailed spread of informatIon
is no longer completely applicable.
To up, we expect a free enterprise economy to underinvest in
invention and research (as compared with an ideal) because it is risky,
because the product can be appropriated only to a limited extent, and
because of increasing returns in use. This underinvestment will be
greater for more basic research. Further, to the extent that a firm suc-
ceeds in engrossing the economic value of its inventive activity, there
will be an underutilization of that information as compared with an
ideal allocation.
Competition, Monopoly, and the Incentive to Innovate
It may be useful to remark that an incentive to invent can exist even
under perfect competition in the product markets though not, of
course, in the "market" for the information contained in the invention.
This is especially clear in the case of a cost reducing invention. Pro-
vided only that suitable royalty payments can be demanded, an inven-
tor can profit without disturbing the competitive nature of the
industry. The situation for a new product invention is not very differ-
ent; by charging a suitable royalty to a competitive industry, the in-
ventor can receive a return equal to the monopoly profits.
I will examine here the incentives to invent for monopolistic and
competitive markets, that is, I will compare the potential profits from
an invention with the costs. The difficulty of appropriating the Inform-
ation will be ignored; the remaining problem is that of indivisibility in
use, an inherent property of information. A competitive situation here
will mean one in which the industry produces under competitive con-
ditions, while the inventor can set an arbitrary royalty for the use of
his invention. In the monopolistic situation, it will be assumed that
only the monopoly itself can invent. Thus a monopoly is understood
here to mean barriers to entry; a situation of temporary monopoly,
due perhaps to a previous innovation, which does not prevent the
entrance of new firms with innovations of their own, is to be regarded
as more nearly competitive than monopolistic for the purpose of this
analysis. It will be argued that the incentive to invent is less under
monopolistic than under competitive conditions but even in the latter
case it will be less than is socially desirable.
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We will assume constant costs both before and after the invention,
the unit costs being c before the invention and c' <c afterward. The
competitive price before invention will therefore be c. Let the corre-
sponding demand beIfr is the level of unit royalties, the com-
petitive price after the invention will be c' + r, but this cannot of course
be higher than c, since firms are always free to produce with the old
methods.
It is assumed that both the demand and the marginal revenue
curves are decreasing. Let R(x) be the marginal revenue curve. Then
the monopoly output before invention, Xm, would be defined by the
equation,
R(Xm)C.
Similarly, the monopoly output after invention is defined by,
R(X'm) =C'.
Let the monopoly prices corresponding to outputs xm and X'm, re-
spectively, be Pm and P'mFinally, let P and F' be the monopolist's
profits before and after invention, respectively.
What is the optimal royalty level for the inventor in the competitive
case? Let us suppose that he calculates the optimal monopoly
price which would obtain in the postinvention situation. If the cost
reduction is sufficiently drastic that P'm <c, then his most profitable
policy is to set r so that the competitive price isp'm, i.e. let,
rP'm —C'
In this case, the inventor's royalties are equal to the profits a monopo-
list would make under the same conditions, i.e. his incentive to invent
will be F'.
Suppose, however, it turns out that P'm > c. Since the sales price
cannot exceed c, the inventor will set his royalties at,
r =c—C'
The competitive price will then be the sales will remain atThe
inventor's incentive will then be, —c').
The monopolist's incentive, on the other hand, is clearly P' —P.
In the first of the two cases cited, the monopolist's incentive is obvi-
ously less than the inventor's incentive under competition, which is
F', not F' —P.The preinvention monopoly power acts as a strong
disincentive to further innovation.
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The analysis is slightly more complicated in the second case. The
monopolist's incentive, F' —P,is the change in revenue less the
change in total cost of production, i.e.,
X'm
— P R(x) dx —C' X'm +CXm.
Sincethe marginal revenue R(x) is diminishing, it must always be less




F' —P<C(X'm — Xm)C' X'm + C Xm = (c — c') X'm.
Inthe case being considered, the postinvention monopoly price,
P'm, is greater than c. Hence, with a declining demand curve, X'm<Xc.
Theabove inequality shows that the monopolist's incentive is always
less than the cost reduction on the postinvention monopoly output,
which in this case is, in turn, less than the competitive output (both
before and after invention). Since the inventor's incentive under com-
petition is the cost reduction on the competitive output, it will again
always exceed the monopolist's incentive.
It can be shown that, if we consider differing values of c', the
difference between the two incentives increases as c' decreases, reach-
ing its maximum of P (preinvention monopoly profits) for c' suffi-
ciently large for the first case to hold. The ratio of the incentive under
competition to that under monopoly, on the other hand, though
always greater than 1, decreases steadily with c'. For c' very close to c
(i.e., very minor inventions), the ratio of the two incentives is approxi-
mately Xc/Xm,i.e.,the ratio of monopoly to competitive output.7
To sketch the proof of these statements quickly, note that, as c' varies, P is a constant.
Hence, from the formula for F' —F,we see that,
d(P' —P)/dc'=dP'/dc'=R(X'm) (dX'mIdC')—C'(dX'mIdC')—
sinceR(X'm)= c'.Let F(c') be the difference between the incentives to invent under
competitive and under monopolistic conditions. In the case wherep'm < c, this difference
is the constant P. Otherwise,
F(c') —(c — c')—(F'—F),
so that
dF/dc' = X'm —
Forthe case considered, we must have X'm < x,, as seen in the text. Hence, dF/dc' ￿ 0, so
621WELFARE ECONOMICS AND INVENTIVE ACTIVITY
The only ground for arguing that monopoly may create superior
incentives to invent is that appropriability may be greater under
monopoly than under competition. Whatever differences may exist
in this direction must, of course, still be offset against the monopolist's
disincentive created by his preinvention monopoly profits.
The incentive to invent in competitive circumstances may also be
compared with the social benefit. It is necessary to distinguish between
the realized social benefit and the potential social benefit, the latter
being the benefit which would accrue under ideal conditions, which,
in this case, means the sale of the product at postinvention cost, c'.
Clearly,the potential social benefit always exceeds the realized social
benefit. I will show that the realized social benefit, in turn, always
equals or exceeds the competitive incentive to invent and, a fortiori,
the monopolist's incentive.
Consider again the two cases discussed above. If the invention is
sufficiently cost reducing so that P'm < c,thenthere is a consumers'
benefit, due to the lowering of price, which has not been appropriated
by the inventor. If not, then the price is unchanged, so that the con-
sumers' position is unchanged, and all benefits do go to the inventor.
Since by assumption all the producers are making zero profits both
before and after the invention, we see that the inventor obtains the
entire realized social benefit of moderately cost reducing inventions
but not of more radical inventions. Tentatively, this suggests a bias
against major inventions, in the sense that an invention, part of whose
costs could be paid for by lump-sum payments by consumers without
making them worse off than before, may not be profitable at the maxi-
mum royalty payments that can be extracted by the inventor.
that F(c') increases as c' decreases.
Let G(c') be the ratio of the incentive under competition to that under monopoly. If
P'm< C, then,
G(c') =P'/(P'—F),
which clearly decreases as c' decreases. For P'm>c,we have,
G(c') =(c — — F).
Then,
dG/dc' =[—(F'—F)+(c —c')x'rn]/(P'—P)2.
Because of the upper bound for F' —Pestablished in the text, the numerator must be
positive; the ratio decreases as c' decreases.
Finally, if we consider c' very close to c, G(c') will be approximately equal to the ratio
of the derivatives of the numerator and denominator (L'Hopital's rule), which is, Xc/X'm,
andwhich approaches Xc/Xmasc' approaches c.
622ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES FOR INVENTION
Alternative Forms of Economic Organization in Invention
The previous discussion leads to the conclusion that for optimal
allocation to invention it would be necessary for the government or
some other agency not governed by profit-and-loss criteria to finance
research and invention. In fact, of course, this has always happened
to a certain extent. The bulk of basic research has been carried on
outside the industrial system, in universities, in the government, and
by private individuals. One must recognize here the importance of
nonpecuniary incentives, both on the part of the investigators and on
the part of the private individuals and governments that have sup-
ported research organizations and universities. In the latter, the
complementarity between teaching and research is, from the point
of view of the economy, something of a lucky accident. Research in
some more applied fields, such as agriculture, medicine, and aero-
nautics, has consistently been regarded as an appropriate subject for
government participation, and its role has been of great importance.
If the government and other nonprofit institutions are to compen-
sate for the underallocation of resources to invention by private enter-
prise, two problems arise: how shall the amount of resources devoted
to invention be determined, and how shall efficiency in their use be
encouraged? These problems arise whenever the government finds it
necessary to engage in economic activities because indivisibilities
prevent the private economy from performing adequately (highways,
bridges, reclamation projects, for example), but the determination of
the relative magnitudes is even more difficult here. Formally, of
course, resources should.be devoted to invention until the expected
marginal social benefit there equals the marginal social benefit in
alternative uses, but in view of the presence of uncertainty, such
calculations are even more difficult and tenuous than those for public
works. Probably all that could be hoped for is the estimation of future
rates of return from those in the past, with investment in invention
being increased or decreased accordingly as some average rate of
return over the past exceeded or fell short of the general rate of return.
The difficulties of even ex post calculation of rates of return are
formidable though possibly not insuperable.8
The problem of efficiency in the use of funds devoted to research
8Foran encouraging study of this type, see Z. Griliches, "Research Costs and Social
Returns: Hybrid Corn and Related Innovations," Journal of Political Economy, 1958,
pp. 419—431.
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is one that has been faced internally by firms in dealing with their own
research departments. The rapid growth of military research and
development has led to a large-scale development of contractual
relations between producers and a buyer of invention and research.
The problems encountered in assuring efficiency here are the same as
those that would be met if the government were to enter upon the
financing of invention and research in civilian fields. The form of
economic relation is very different from that in the usual markets.
Payment is independent of product; it is governed by costs, though
the net reward (the fixed fee) is independent of both. This arrange-
ment seems to fly in the face of the principles for encouraging efficiency,
and doubtless it does lead to abuses, but closer examination shows
both mitigating factors and some explanation of its inevitability. In
the first place, the awarding of new contracts will depend in part on
past performance, so that incentives for efficiency are not completely
lacking. In the second place, the relation between the two parties to
the contract is something closer than a purely market relation. It is
more like the sale of professional services, where the seller con-
tracts to supply not so much a specific result as his best judgment.
(The demand for such services also arises from uncertainty and the
value of information.) In the third place, payment by results would
involve great risks for the inventor, risks against which, as we have
seen, he could hedge only in part.
There is clear need for further study of alternative methods of com-
pensation. For example, some part of the contractual payment might
depend on the degree of success in invention. But a more serious
problem is the decision as to which contracts to let. One would need
to examine the motivation underlying government decision making
in this area. Hitch has argued that there are biases in governmental
allocation, particularly against risky invention processes, and an ex-
cessive centralization, though the latter could be remedied by better
policies.9
One can go further. There is really no need for the firm to be the
fundamental unit of organization in invention; there is plenty of
reason to suppose that individual talents count for a good deal more
than the firm as an organization. If provision is made for the rental
of necessary equipment, a much wider variety of research contracts
with individuals as well as firms and with varying modes of payment,
including incentives, could be arranged. Still other forms of organiza-
°Op.cit.
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tion, such as research institutes financed by industries, the govern-
ment, and private philanthropy, could be made to play an even
livelier role than they now do.
COMMENT
C. J. HITCH, The RAND Corporation
There is, I think, one important aspect of government policy with
respect to research and development that Markham failed to discuss—
the government's contracting and management policies in this area.
The problems here are related to Arrow's discussion of incentives,
particularly his remarks concerning risk bearing and the adverse alloc-
ative effects of cost-plus contracts.
Let me illustrate one set of such problems by contrasting the manage-
ment policies used by the Army Air Corps before World War II in
developing new combat aircraft with the policies now used by the Air
Force in developing aircraft and missiles.
Before the war the Air Corps would typically announce a com-
petition for a new aircraft type, the desired characteristics of which
would be described in general terms. Any aircraft company that
wanted to enter the competition would develop and build, with its
own funds, the required number of prototypes (usually one to three).
The competition consisted in flying and testing, at Dayton, the pro-
totypes entered by the companies. The prize for the winner was a
production contract. The losers lost their stake.
Now, typically, the competition occurs at the design stage. The
competing companies enter drawings, with their estimates of per-
formance (and time and cost of development). The winner of the de-
sign competition is awarded a development contract which, if things
go favorably, is transformed later into a production contract. Occa-
sionally, if the program is considered very important, two competing
designs may be approved for development or even production (cf.
the Atlas and Titan). But usually the development of more than one
model is considered too expensive.
In fact, the greatly increased cost of development is the reason
given for this change in policy. When the cost of developing a new
vehicle is from $0.5 billion to $2.0 billion, it seems evident that no
aircraft company can assume the risk, and perhaps also that even the
government can not finance multiple developments.
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Nevertheless, the new policy appears far from ideal. The aircraft
companies risk nothing (even the cost of preparing designs is usually
reimbursed). Because of the great uncertainties involved in any major
development, it is hard to make a wise selection at the design stage.
Companies have a natural tendency to be optimistic in estimating
performance, cost, and availability at this stage—sometimes much
more so than at other stages as Klein and Marshall and Meckling
have shown. Arid the Air Force has a natural tendency to favor the
more optimistic proposals. As a result, the specifications in the
development contract are sometimes unrealistic to the point of causing
inordinate delay.
Moreover, once the winner has been selected, there is no more com-
petition. The company may put its best team on the development for
the sake of patriotism or its own long term reputation, but the power-
ful incentive of competition i.s lacking. Partly for this reason the Air
Force, locked to a sole source with a cost-plus contract, has to exercise
a kind and degree of control during the development process that is
inconsistent with management prerogatives as they are understood
and practiced in other parts of the free enterprise economy.
I believe the inefficiencies resulting from these policies and pro-
cedures are serious, and worthy of much more attention by economists.
It does no good simply to inveigh against the iniquities of cost-plus
contracting and government risk bearing when we are unable to pro-
pose a practical alternative. Perhaps part of the answer lies in some
form of risk sharing. What is badly needed here is an economics inven-
tion or, more probably, several of them. The government is going to
be in the business of supporting research and development on a large
scale for a long time, and it is important that it use policies that take
advantage of the incentives present in the economy.
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